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The external shocks emphasized by the standard optimum currency area 
approach (i.e. shocks to exports and exchange rates) have surprisingly little 
influence on employment and unemployment in most member countries.
It is often argued that low labour mobility in Europe means high potential costs 
of EMU. However, this conclusion has to be modified on three accounts:
i) international labour mobility in Europe is of the same order of magnitude as 
inter-regional labour mobility within member countries.
ii) Higher labour mobility might also have an adverse impact because it makes 
regional concentration more likely, thus increasing the likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks.
iii) Inter-regional mobility within the US is high, but its role in the adjustment 
to shocks has been exaggerated in the literature.
The low degree of labour mobility in Europe is thus much less of an obstacle 




























































































The EU is not a homogenous area. Germans and Danes are about three times 
richer than Greeks (at current exchange rates) and agriculture employs only 
about 2 % of the active population in the UK, but 14 % in Greece and 12 % in 
Ireland. At the regional level the spread between the extremes can be even 
larger. Do these large differences in wealth and economic structure across 
member countries, and regions inside them, mean that EMU is undesirable? 
This paper discusses this large issue by addressing two more specific questions:
i) What is the empirical relevance of asymmetric external shocks? The key 
question here is: do external shocks (i.e. shocks to exports and/or the exchange 
rate have a strong impact on (un)employment? This key issue has never been 
clearly addressed up to now.
ii) How important is labour mobility?
Is the general impression that labour mobility is extremely low in Europe 
justified? Is more labour mobility desirable for EMU (because it facilitates 
adjustment)? Or is it undesirable (because it favours concentration), hence 
leading to more shocks?
The regional dimension is often overlooked in discussions about EMU because 
it has to be assumed that the alternative to EMU is the continuing existence of 
national currencies, and not the introduction of regional currencies. However, 
most European regions are of a similar size as the average state of the US which 
are often compared to member countries.1
The paper starts in section II by analyzing directly the main reason why 
diversity matters in a monetary union: if asymmetric shocks are frequent and 
large the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument is costly. Does 
experience suggests that this will be the case? Section III then briefly discusses 
to what extent diversity in the EU comes from differences between countries or 
between regions. Section IV provides some new evidence on labour mobility in 




























































































II. Unemployment and Asymmetric Shocks
II. 1 The Optimum Currency Area Approach: Existing Empirical 
Literature.
The standard line of reasoning in support for exchange rate flexibility is the 
following: if a shock reduces the demand for the exports of a country a real 
depreciation is required to maintain full employment and external equilibrium. 
The required real depreciation could also be achieved by a reduction in nominal 
(’money’) wages, but this takes time and can presumably be achieved only if 
there is a period of substantial unemployment. The proper exchange rate policy 
could thus reduce, and possibly even eliminate, the unemployment problems that 
arise from ’asymmetric shocks’.
The available studies on the potential importance of this effect do not attempt 
to test this line of reasoning directly. They usually analyze the degree to which 
various macroeconomic indicators, e.g. output, the real exchange rate, 
unemployment, etc., are correlated across countries. The implicit benchmark is 
the US in the sense that it is argued that if the economies of member countries 
show a similar degree of correlation among them as do states or regions inside 
the US EMU should not create particular problems.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), to give just one prominent example, compare 
the correlation of certain shocks to output among 8 regions within the US and 
among 11 member states within the EU. They distinguish between shocks that 
have transitory effects, which they assume to be demand shocks, and shocks that 
have permanent effects, which they assume to be supply shocks. The main 
finding is that the supply shocks, thus defined, are larger in magnitude and less 
correlated across regions in Europe than in the US whereas the opposite holds 
for demand (i.e. transitory) shocks. Moreover, they also confirm that the core 
of the EU (here D, F, BE, NL and DK) constitutes a homogenous sub-unit. 
Within this restricted group of countries, supply (i.e. permanent) shocks are of 
roughly the same magnitude and cohesion as in the US.
Another example of this approach can be found in De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke (1993) who analyze the variability of real exchange rates across 
regions and countries. The finding that real exchange rates vary significantly 
more across countries than across regions within a country is difficult to 
interpret: Is it due to an excess volatility of exchange rates or are there large 




























































































Most economists would agree that the main cause of short run variations in 
macroeconomic variables, such as output and employment, should be changes 
in monetary and fiscal policy.2 The correlations in output found for the past 
thus reflect not only the working of ’intrinsic’ factors like taste and technology, 
but also, and perhaps mainly, the extent to which monetary and fiscal policy 
have in the past (under different exchange rate regimes) tended to move together 
across countries. Hence the high correlations found for the core countries are 
probably an underestimate of the correlations that would result under EMU 
because monetary union by definition unifies monetary policy and might lead 
to more coordination in fiscal policy as well. It can also not be excluded that 
some of the countries that had lower correlations in the past would actually 
belong to the core once they also belong to EMU.
A different way to search for asymmetric shocks looks at differences in 
economic structures, e.g. differences in the shares of output accounted for by 
different industries or the product composition of exports. The underlying 
hypothesis here is that countries that have different economic structures are 
likely to experience asymmetric shocks. Gros (1996) provides a number of 
indicators along this line and shows that they can give quite different results.
II. 2 A Direct Test of the OCA Approach.
However, all the studies mentioned so far look only at the potential for 
asymmetric shocks or measure co-movements in macroeconomic variables 
without showing how shocks lead to unemployment. The basic question that has 
not yet been addressed in the literature is: are the ’classic’ asymmetric shocks, 
i.e. shocks to export demand actually an important determinant of 
unemployment? A subsidiary question would concern the role of exchange rate 
adjustments in containing unemployment generated by shocks to export.
The basic question to what extent variations in export demand affect 
unemployment could be addressed by building a large model which traces the 
impact of changes in export demand through the entire economy under various 
assumptions about the flexibility of wages and the exchange rate. An alternative, 
and much simpler approach, used here, is to determine ’only’ the extent to 
which changes in exports have influenced unemployment in the past. The 
underlying hypothesis in this case is that export supply is rather stable so that 






























































































The analysis reported more in detail in Jones and Gros (1995) is summarized in 
Table 1 which shows the results of causality tests using annual data. These tests 
measure the impact of (changes in) various measures of export performance on 
(changes in) national unemployment rates once the autonomous movements in 
unemployment have been taken into account by including the lagged (change in) 
the unemployment rate among the explanatory variables. (One has to use 
changes as the levels of both variables are clearly non-stationary.) A significant 
effect (of whatever sign) implies that one can reject at the 5% confidence level 
the hypothesis that exports do not influence unemployment. A negative sign in 
this table means that an increase in exports reduces unemployment, as one would 
expect.
(see Table 1)
This table reports basically the result from a fishing trip. The result is not 
interesting in the usual sense that there are some ’significant’ relationships. On 
the contrary its interest lies in the absence of a strong and robust link between 
unemployment and (past changes in) exports. Each entry in this table shows a 
plus or minus sign if the variable listed at the head of the column turned out to 
have a significant influence on unemployment, for the particular country 
concerned. The first four columns report the results of tests of the hypothesis 
that (changes in) national unemployment rates are not affected by shocks to the 
following variables: i) Changes in exports in constant 1990 ecus, ii) changes in 
intra-European exports as percentage of GDP, iii) changes in total exports as 
percentage of GDP, and, iv) the contribution of exports to the growth in final 
uses. If there is no entry in cell one can not reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship at the 95 % confidence level. A negative sign implies that one can 
reject the null hypothesis and that an increase in one of these proxies for export 
performance leads to a fall in unemployment (as one would expect). A positive 
sign implies the opposite and would be difficult to explain.
A glance at these four columns shows that the first and the last variables are the 
ones that have the largest numbers of entries. But even if one concentrates on 
the variables that perform ’best’ it still remains true that for almost half of all 
member countries shocks to exports have in the past played no significant role 
in determining unemployment in the way one would expect from the OCA 
approach. This was found for a large country like France as for a small country 
like Denmark (where the sign is wrong), for a poor country like Spain and for 




























































































For the other member countries shocks to exports had some influence on the 
evolution of unemployment. However, a closer look at the individual regression 
that could not be reported in this table because they would have taken too much 
space, shows that this influence was in all cases minor in the sense that shocks 
to export earnings could explain only a very small part of the fluctuations of 
unemployment rates over time. The three countries that showed the strongest 
influence of exports on unemployment were Austria, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, which are usually counted as part of the core EMU.
The strongest influence of exports on unemployment can be found in the case 
of Belgium. However, even in this case the standard deviation of the 
unemployment rate (after accounting for its own past) is 0.60 percentage points, 
introducing the best performing measure of exports peroffmance it drops to 0.48 
percentage points, or by about 21 %. This means that for Belgium export shocks 
had a non-negligible but still rather small effect on unemployment. This is one 
of the strongest effect found in the entire sample. For the other countries the 
contribution of export shocks to unemployment was thus minor. In the case of 
Denmark the weak correlation that actually appeared in one case (if one uses the 
export to GDP ratio) has the wrong sign; i.e. increases in export demand are 
associated with increases in unemployment.
The last four columns use two different measures of unemployment 
performance: i) the difference between national and EU average unemployment 
rates (to correct for any EU business cycle), the last two columns, ii) the third 
and fourth last columns use the change in this variable because some tests 
indicate that the difference national minus EU average was not stationary. The 
measures for export performance used with these dependent variable was then 
also somewhat different as explained in the foonote to table 1. However, even 
a cursory glance at the last columns of this table shows that there are even fewer 
significant entries (and two positive signs) so that changing the dependent 
variable does not affect the conclusion that the impact of exports on 
unemployment is weak.3
b) Quarterly Data
The main problem with the annual data used so far is that the strongest 
correlation is contemporaneous. Could one obtain better results using quarterly 
data? In other words do quarterly data reveal a significant causal relationship 
between changes in export volumes and changes in the level of employment or 
unemployment? The quarterly data should at least yield a clearer pattern over 




























































































contemporaneous correlation was eliminated. However, in most other respects 
the results were similar to the ones obtained from annual data.
The first test involved looking at the link between employment in manufacturing 
(index 1990=100, as reported by the IMF) and export volumes (index 1990=100, 
also from the IMF) using data from 1960:1 to 1994:1. This was done again in 
changes since preliminary tests indicated that both variables were non-stationary. 
The main result can be stated briefly: a significant relationship between (changes 
in) export volumes and (changes in) employment appears for only five of the ten 
countries examined: the United States, Japan, Spain, France, and the 
Netherlands. The countries which failed to reveal a significant causal relationship 
were Germany, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Austria.
As in the causality tests using annual data two equations were estimated for each 
of the ten countries. The first included (the change in) employment as dependent 
variable to be explained by a constant, four lags of the dependent variable, and 
three quarterly dummies. The second equation added eight lags of the change in 
export volumes to the right-hand side. Table la summarizes the regression 
statistics for both equations only for those countries for which at least one 
coefficient on lagged export growth was significant. All the other countries 
did not even show a single significant coefficient on exports. This result is even 
more surprising than the previous one concerning (economy-wide) 





























































































Table la: Change in Employment rates as a function of their own history and
past changes in Export Volumes.










US 0.60 0.64 T-8 -0.018 0.006 2.77*
Japan 0.72 0.72 T-2 -0.014 0.007 1.02
Spain 0.33 0.32 T-8 0.015 0.006 1.13
France 0.51 0.53 T-5 -0.041 0.021 1.33**
NL 0.25 0.27 T-2 0.038 0.019 1.61*
* significant at the 1 percent threshold; ** significant at the 25 percent 
threshold.
Data source: IMF, International Finance Statistics.
The results in Table la  are striking for two reasons. The first is that even for the 
countries selected for the greatest influence of exports the adjusted R-squared 
increases only marginally with the introduction of lagged changes in export 
volumes among the explanatory variables. Thus, it would seem that the “other 
factors” which affect changes in employment rates, beyond the autoregressive 
element coming from the past, are collectively far more important than shocks 
to exports.
Second, the coefficients on past export performance — more often than not — 
take the wrong sign. The correlation between past changes in export volumes 
and present changes in employment levels should be positive — and increase in 
past exports should give rise to an increase in present employment. However, in 
three of the five cases one finds the reverse: an increase in past exports leads to 
a decrease in present employment.
For those countries not included in Table la (Germany, Denmark, Italy, Ireland 
and Portugal) the adjusted R-squared fell when the eight lags of export changes 
were introduced and so that the F-statistic should be below 1. Hence we did not 




























































































The same approach was repeated using a (much shorter) series of quarterly 
unemployment data (reported by the European Commission) as the dependent 
variable and five lags of export performance. Five lags were sufficient since in 
no case was a lag beyond 5 significant when this dependent variable was used.
This time, however, only nine European countries for which data was easily 
available were considered: Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Only two of the 
countries revealed statistically significant relationship: France and Portugal. The 
summary statistics are reported in Table lb.
Table lb: Change in Unemployment rates as a function of their own history
and past changes in Export Volumes (1983:1 to 1993:4).










France 0.93 0.94 T-3 0.023 0.010 1.13
Portugal 0.44 0.61 T-4 0.042 0.015 1.58**
* significant at the 1 percent threshold; ** significant at the 25 percent 
threshold.
Data source: IMF, International Finance Statistics; CEC, Eurostat.
As with the preceding analysis, the sign to the coefficients we find are not what 
one would expect. A past increase in export volumes is associated with a present 
increase in unemployment. Moreover — with the exception of Portugal, for 
which we had only 26 observations -- the increased explanatory power generated 
by adding lags of export performance is very small. As with Table la, the seven 
countries not included in Table lb (Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) had F-statistics equal to or below 
1 (for the test of significance of lagged exports).
All in all these results thus suggest that for most member states shocks to 
exports have not been a major factor in determining the evolution of 
unemployment (and employment) in the past. It is always very difficult to prove 




























































































using a number of different indicators of export demand this finding is rather 
robust. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that this will change in the 
future. Hence there is little reason to believe that shocks to the demand for 
exports will lead to significant unemployment problems in member countries 
under EMU. Poorer member states are not threatened more than richer ones. On 
the contrary, the two countries for which the potential problems are most severe 
are Belgium and the Netherlands, both of which are usually considered members 
of the rich core.
II. 3 Robustness: The Influence of the Exchange Rate.
The absence of a robust relationship between export earnings could be explained 
away in a number of ways. A first objection would be that actual export shocks 
are determined by shocks to supply as well as demand. However, it is difficult 
to see why export supply should be subject to large shocks that act within one 
year or one quarter. The capital stock and even labour inputs move only slowly 
and technology does not make jumps. By contrast it is much easier to imagine 
reasons why export demand should be unstable: the business cycle abroad can 
move rapidly or tastes can change suddenly. Moreover, a shock to export supply 
might lead mainly to a change in the quantity of exports and less in 
unemployment.
Another argument could be that the absence of a clear relationship between 
unemployment and export shocks is due to a consistent policy that on average 
offsets the impact of export shocks by using optimally some policy instrument, 
for example the exchange rate (or fiscal policy, see below).
In principle this last point could be taken into account although, the degree to 
which the exchange rate was used as an adjustment instrument varied 
enormously over the last 30 years. (The degree of wage flexibility might also 
have varied considerably, but it is difficult to find any succinct measure of this 
latter variable. This aspect was therefore not used in the empirical analysis.) 
However, the crude tests on the annual data reported below that this factor 
cannot have been responsible for the results so far.
Exchange rate adjustments should thus be incorporated in the analysis because 
otherwise one could argue that the absence of an effect of export shocks on 
unemployment is be due to the fact that during part of the period used in this 
investigation (1963 - 1993) exchange rates were flexible. One way to test this 




























































































of unemployment. Table 2 reports the results with annual data obtained using a 
similar approach as the one used to measure the importance of shocks to exports: 
the change of the real exchange rate is included among the variables explaining 
changes in unemployment. A general result is that innovations in the (real) 
exchange rate have also not had a noticeable impact on unemployment. The real 
exchange rate has a significant impact on unemployment (once one takes into 
account past unemployment) only for the UK and Germany.
(see Table 2)
These results were obtained by just adding actual changes in the real exchange 
rate as one of the determinants of unemployment. The use of actual exchange 
rate changes implies that one does not measure only the relevance of the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument. Under floating rates, exchange rates 
determinants by many factors and do not always move in the direction wanted 
by policy makers. The fluctuations of the Italian lire starting in 1992 are only 
the most recent example. The results reported in table 2 thus indicate that in 
general exchange rates are not a major policy instrument that has had in the past 
a major impact on unemployment.
One result that is consistent across countries is thus that the exchange rate has 
had very little impact on unemployment in the past. The argument that the 
exchange rate instrument was used up to now to offset shocks to export demand 
that would otherwise have resulted in unemployment is thus not supported by 
the experience.
The small influence of exchange rates on unemployment is understandable if one 
takes into account that the ratio of exports to GDP in the larger countries is 
around 25 to 30 % and that the price elasticity of exports is about one half. 
These two numbers imply that a 10 depreciation (in real terms) increases GDP 
by between 1.25 to 1.5 %. Further more one has to take into account ’Okuns 
law’ which says that one needs around 3 % growth in real income to reduce 
unemployment by one percentage point. The reduction in unemployment that 




























































































II. 4 Other Types of Shocks
This study has concentrated shocks to exports. What about other shocks? Any 
type of shock could have an effect on the exchange rate. Policy shocks, e.g. 
changes in fiscal or other economic policies affect overall demand and thus also 
the exchange rate as could be observed in the case of the US dollar during the 
1980s. However, policy shocks are not unavoidable and it is not always clear 
that in this case an exchange rate adjustment is a desirable consequence from a 
global point of view.
Imagine the case of a country which experiences a sudden fall in domestic 
demand because households suddenly save more. A depreciation would shift 
demand towards domestic goods and increase exports, thus reducing the 
unemployment that would otherwise result from the drop in demand. However, 
the ’gain’ in demand of the country experiencing the shock would come at the 
expense of the rest of the world. The country that depreciates would only export 
its unemployment problems. From a global point of view little would be gained 
from exchange rate flexibility in this case.
This argument that at the global level the effects of exchange rate changes on 
demand net out to zero does not apply to shocks that affect trade directly. If 
demand shifts from one country to another an exchange rate adjustment is 
required from the point of view of both. Hence fluctuations in exports are the 
main source of shocks that should be taken into account to ascertain the 
importance of exchange rate flexibility from a global point of view. Other 
legitimate sources of shocks would be external shocks (like an oil price change) 
that have differential effects because of differences in the importance of energy.
It is difficult to imagine in concrete terms economy-wide shocks that are driven 
by sudden changes technology or tastes. While there might be sudden changes 
at the sectoral level experience indicates that these fundamental determinants of 
the economy tend to change slowly at the aggregate level, which should give 
prices and wages enough time to adjust to maintain equilibrium. For example, 
the rise in the importance of the automobile industry or the decline of railways 
took decades. These secular changes caused certainly severe adjustment 
problems, but the argument that adjustments in the real exchange rate can be 
achieved quicker through changes in the nominal exchange rate loses its 




























































































III. Regions versus countries
The existence of nation states in the EU has to be taken as given. But from an 
economic point of view it is not a foregone conclusion that countries are the best 
economic units and that asymmetric shocks can also hit regions within a large 
country. A number of papers have shown that there is indeed a surprising 
amount of diversity across regions within member countries. De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeeke (1993), for example, analyze the traditional optimum currency 
area issues of labour mobility and asymmetric shocks at the regional level. They 
find that asymmetric shocks are even more important and persistent at the 
regional level than at the national level. However, they also confirm that labour 
mobility is much larger within than across countries. This suggests that labour 
mobility can be an adjustment mechanism within, but not across countries.
But this seemingly clear result has to be nuanced if one analyses the European 
labour market at the regional level more thoroughly, as done by Decressin and 
Fatas (1994) (following the methodology pioneered by Blanchard and Katz 
(1992) for the US). These studies show that the regional experience is more 
diverse in the EU than in the US. In Europe only 20 % of the variations in 
employment by region is due to the overall European component whereas the 
corresponding part of the national component for the US is 60 %. In Europe the 
regional or idiosyncratic component is responsible for 50 % of variations in 
regional employment even after allowing for factors that operate at the country 
level. The regional dimension is thus in a sense more important than the national 
dimension for employment creation in Europe.
The main other findings relate to the nature of the shocks affecting employment 
and unemployment. The US and the EU are similar in that shocks to regional 
unemployment rates are typically permanent and shocks to relative (relative to 
the US or EU average) regional unemployment rates are typically transitory. In 
both cases the idiosyncratic shocks are thus mostly transitory.
The differences between the US and the EU lie in the adjustment mechanism. 
In the US adjustment to an (un)employment shock is through migration whereas 
in the EU the participation rate adjusts.
With respect to regions one can again ask whether poorer regions show a 
systematically different behaviour. The results in Table 4 indicate that there is 
no systematic relationship between income per capita and the degree to which 
employment growth in a region is related to the European average. For the 




























































































regions reacts less to the European average than poor ones. This result comes 
from a cross-section regression that uses the results of Decressin and Fatas 
(1994) who report, for the 50 regions they consider, the coefficient of a times 
series regression which links unemployment in each region on the average 
European unemployment rate. The 50 coefficients found this way can then be 
related in a cross section regression to income per capita which yields a negative 
coefficient that is different from zero with a probability of over 99 %. The 
unemployment rate in richer regions is thus more likely to be negatively 
correlated with the European average than that of poorer ones. There is thus no 
evidence that poorer regions are more exposed to business cycle fluctuations 
than richer ones. Given that it is commonly assumed that it is better for an EMU 
if the component regions move together over the business cycle this implies that, 
on average, poorer regions will fit better into EMU than the richer ones.
Table 4
Regional labour market performance: rich and poor
Independent variable: 








B; = 0.98 + 0:97*GDP 
(2.53) (0.25)
S.e.= 0.78 R2 =-0.02






Si = 2.03 - 9.8*GDP 
(6.94) (-3.37) 
S.e.= 0.59 R2=0.17
ôj = 2.2 - 11.6*GDP 
(6.33) (-3.3)
S.e. =0.59 R2=0.17
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Decressin and Fatas (1994), page 20/21, table 1A 
which contains the regression coefficients from tinter alial the following regressions: 
Alog(Ni,)=a,i+BiAlog(Nt,)+error(growth rate of employment in region i as a function of growth of 
employment in the EU) and Ui,=a2i+6iUcl (the unemployment rate in region i as a function of the 
European unemployment rate).




























































































Further material on the importance of the regional dimension is provided by De 
Nardis et al. (1994) who analyzes the structure of employment by industry in 
each region and performs a cluster analysis in order to find out what regions 
have a similar economic structure. They find that most regions belong to one of 
5 groups with a specific specialization (agriculture, heavy industry, etc.). 
However, countries do not seem to specialize, all large countries have regions 
in several groups and even some of the smaller countries have regions in more 
than one group. Hence it appears that most countries have a diversified basket 
of different regions.
IV. EMU and labour mobility
Concentration of industry and hence pronounced core periphery patterns are 
more likely to emerge when labour mobility is high. But since most studies 
concur that labour mobility is low in Europe (not only across countries, but also 
across regions within countries; always compared to the US) there should be less 
concentration in Europe than in the US.
Some authors have used this line of thought to arrive at a sort of catch 22: As 
long as labour mobility is low in Europe EMU is costly because labour mobility 
is needed to offset asymmetric shocks. However, so the argument goes; if labour 
mobility were to increase (possibly because EMU comes anyway) concentration 
would increase and hence the likelihood of asymmetric shocks would also 
increase, again making EMU costly. The suggested conclusion is that heads 
EMU is impossible and tails it is not desirable. The proper conclusion would 
seem to be that labour mobility is perhaps less crucial for EMU than previously 
thought: Although labour mobility allows for a quicker adjustment to shocks it 
also favours concentration of industry and hence increases the potential for 
asymmetric shocks.
However, since labour mobility is usually assumed to be important it is still 
useful to take a look at the data which does not always yields the results that are 
commonly expected.
i. Inter-national versus inter-regional mobility
It is a commonly accepted proposition that labour mobility in Europe is very low 
in absolute terms and compared to the US. A corollary is that the potential costs 
of EMU should be high. The degree of labour mobility in Europe has, however, 




























































































material. This is now changing.4 However, the data now available do not 
confirm the widely held notion of low international labour mobility.
In 1992 almost 2.2 million immigrants came to the member states of the EU 
(equivalent to about 0.7 % of population). And it appears (these data are less 
reliable) that emigration was more than 1 million lower than immigration. This 
can be compared to the US where the average net immigration was about 800 
thousand on average per annum during 1986-91 (about 0,4% of population), 
lower than that of the EU in 1992.
If one wants to judge whether the observed level of migration in the EU 
indicates a degree of labour mobility that is so low that asymmetric shocks in 
an EMU will lead to serious problems inter-regional migration within member 
states provides a useful reference point.5 Table 3 therefore shows the most 
recent available data on immigration from the rest of the world as a percentage 
of the overall population and the percentage of the population that moved 
between regions within the country. Given that the data or emigration is much 
more partial only the data on immigration will be discussed below.6
Table 3 shows that the total number of immigrants arriving in EU countries, 
about 2.3 million is below the number of inter-regional migrants, about 3.1 
million. However, the orders of magnitude are similar. Inter-national migration 
amounts to more than 2/3 of inter-regional migration. One can also compare the 
(unweighed) averages of the populations that move across national and regional 
borders. Inter-regional migration amounted on average to 0.89 % of population 
whereas inter-national migration was equal to 0.67 %, again more than 2/3 of 
the intra-national level.
Hence it appears that contrary to what economists have so far assumed inter­
regional and inter-national migration are of a similar order of magnitude in 
Europe. What conclusions can one draw from this? While one should not 
presume automatically that inter-regional migration within member states is 
sufficient to make them optimum currency areas one can at least conclude that - 
for a given importance of asymmetric shocks- a monetary union for the EU 
should not create more problems than the monetary unions coinciding with 
existing nation states create at the regional level; provided one can assume that 




























































































Table 3: Migration in Europe












Average 0.67 0.89 2356.7 3131.107
♦ Source: Eurostat
♦ N.B : Immigration into SW, SF, L, IRL, GR, DK (all the countries for which no data on inter-regional migration is available) was to 
equal 186.9 thousands.
n't Can labour mobility be a substitute for real wage adjustments?
The usual line of reasoning is quite simple: In EMU unemployment will arise 
if an external shock hits a given country or region because nominal wages 
usually do not adjust quickly enough to re-establish equilibrium on the labour 
market. It is then argued that if all the unemployed left (and go the 
country/regions which experience the mirror image, or positive side of the same 
shock) there would be no problem. However, this argument is too simple since 
it neglects the fact that those who leave also reduce the demand for domestic 
products. Emigration of the unemployed shifts the demand for labour again 
downwards, which implies that at the (by assumption) fixed nominal wage there 
will be a second round of unemployment.
A simple graph can illustrate this idea quite easily. Figure represents the usual 
model of the labour market: labour supply is fixed at NP (e.g. a constant share 
of the total population) and labour demand, Nd, is the usual function of the real 
wage (on the vertical axis). Initially equilibrium is attained at the full 
employment level Ns. An external demand shock is assumed to shift the labour 
demand schedule to the left. If real wages cannot adjust labour demand drops 
to N’ and there is unemployment equal to Ns - N’.
Apparently the unemployment problem could be solved if the unemployed 
emigrated until TP drops to N \ However, this reasoning neglects that the labour 
demand curve depends not only on the real wage rate, but also on the level of 
overall demand. Since the unemployed receive in reality unemployment benefits 
which allow them to maintain their spending close that of the employed they 




























































































emigrate the domestic demand curve for labour will again shift to the left, thus 
aggravating the fall in employment that occurred in the first round. At the given 
wage rate this leads to more unemployment and hence more emigration; etc.. 
This circle will not continue forever since one the induced shift in labour 
demand should be smaller than the original one.
By how much should the demand for labour curve move down if the 
unemployed leave? Should it move at all? With the assumption of fixed 
nominal wages one is in a keynesian environment and a lot will depend on other 
parts of the model, especially the consumption function (including the way in 
which the government budget constraint is taken into account) and the 
proportion of consumption that goes on domestic, perhaps non-tradable goods.
While the strength of the effect is not clear it should be clear that labour 
mobility can magnify the impact of external disturbances on output.
iii) The contribution to labor mobility to adjustment
It is apparent that people move much more often in the US than in Europe. 
However, what matters in the context of discussions about EMU is the extent to 
which net movements react to local unemployment. It is surprising to note how 
little hard evidence exists on this point. The most widely cited study is 
Eichengreen (1993) who compares the reaction of inter-regional migration to 
local unemployment and wages in the US, UK and Italy. He finds that net 
immigration to any of the 9 Census regions reacts indeed to unemployment in 
the previous period, however, the effect is rather imprecisely estimated since the 
t-statistic is only 1.92.7 The point estimate (-0.37) implies that net immigration 
would fall only by 0.0825 (percentage points) if the average unemployment for 
the US is 8 % and if it increases in any region from this level to 10 %. If 
migrants have the same family composition and activity rates as the local 
population the change in migration would thus be equivalent to l/25th of the 
increase in unemployment.8
Blanchard and Katz (1992) report a much stronger reaction of migration to 
unemployment. They estimate that a negative shock to employment in any 
’average’ US state is offset within one period by about 60 % through migration. 
The problem with their approach is, however, that they do not use any data on 
migration, instead they calculate implicit migration effects from their data on 




























































































Blanchard and Katz (1992) (henceforth BK) argue that migration must account 
for most of the adjustment to shocks to employment in the US since they find 
that a 1 % shock to employment in a given state is followed typically by a 0.3 
% increase the unemployed and a very small (0.05) decrease in labour force 
participation. According to BK migration must account for the difference, i.e. 
0.65 % of the total adjustment. This interpretation implies that if General Motors 
fires 100 workers 65 of them leave the region within one year. This is difficult 
to believe even for the US.
However, the BK approach seems to have internal difficulties which become 
apparent once one applies the same methodology to a European country. As an 
illustrative example I replicated the BK methodology using data from Germany 
(relative to the EU) average. The tri-variate system (percentage change in 
employment, employment rate and participation rate, all Germany relative to 
US) seems to work well. It yields a sort of ’Okun coefficient’ of about 0.33, 
similar to the one found by BK for the average US state. Moreover, and this is 
crucial, the reaction of the labour force participation rate to employment shocks 
is larger than in the US, but still moderate: a fall in employment of 1 % leads 
to a fall in participation of 0.39 % in the first year. The ’implicit’ migration 
would thus be for Germany 0.28 (the result of 1 - 0.33 -0.39). This is still too 
high to be believable. The dynamics of the system implies that after 3 years, the 
loss of employment has increased to 2 %, unemployment has increased only to 
0.42 % (its peak) and labour force participation has fallen by a cumulative 1.2 
%, meaning that 38 % of the number initially fired should have emigrated in the 
meantime.
V. Conclusions
Is EMU desirable despite the heterogeneity of the EU? This note argues that 
differences in income should not be an obstacle to EMU.
The basic reason is that differences in income levels are not, per se. an obstacle 
for EMU. Poorer countries benefit potentially as much from EMU as richer ones 
from the gains in transactions costs. However, poorer countries usually also have 
a different industrial structure, which in turn might imply that they are more 
likely to experience asymmetric shocks. But if one looks at the experience of EU 
member countries there is little evidence that poorer member countries have had 
in the past a stronger need for exchange rate adjustments than the richer ones. 
Hence there is no evidence that poorer countries should benefit less from EMU 




























































































operation of the Union. Nor is there evidence that poorer regions would create 
more problems for the management of EMU than richer ones.
The main empirical finding of this paper is that unemployment problems in the 
past have had little to do with external shocks and exchange rates. Hence it is 
not likely that the lack of exchange rate adjustments under EMU will lead to 
major problems in this area. The standard argument that EMU will lead to more 
unemployment because symmetric shocks could no longer be offset through 
exchange rate changes has been exaggerated.
International labour movements in the EU (especially immigration from third 
countries) have now increased to a point were they are of a comparable order 
of magnitude as inter-regional migration within member countries. EMU should 
thus not be more difficult to manage than the existing Monetary Unions in 
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1. The average US state has a population of 4.8 million (and the std of state population is 5.2 
million), average and std o f population of Eurostat regions, how many above US average?
2. This makes the finding that temporary shocks tend to be less symmetric in the US than in 
Europe difficult to interpret.
3. In the case o f Spain the notation -/+ means an increase in real exports first reduces 
unemployment and then increases it, with the net effect equal to zero. However, these cases 
of a significant wrong sign should be discounted - along with some of the weaker coefficients 
of the right sign. Given the number of regressions that are behind table (11 countries using 
8 proxies for export demand) it is surprising that there are not more cases of spurious 
correlation.
4. See ’Statistics in Focus’ 1995, 3 of Eurostat that concentrates on international migration 
concerning EU member states.
5. The most recent available data on this is for 1990 - 1992, but it appears that inter-regional 
migration within member states has been rather stable over the last decade.
6. For inter-regional movements within member states emigrants equal immigrants by 
assumption. One should also keep in mind that the national definitions of what constitutes 
an immigrant (or migrant) vary greatly.
7. However, the constant term in his equation is rather precisely estimated (t-statistic of 5 76) 
and indicates that immigration amounts each year to about 1.1 % of the population of the 
region if  the region has the same wage rate and unemployment rate as the average for the 
entire US. The constant term is about 10 times higher for the US than for the UK.
8. Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) analyse the behaviour of sectoral employment in some member 
states and US regions. They find that most of the shocks to employment are industry specific 
and both the US and European countries, but they chose to interpret the same result 
differently: for the US this result is taken to indicate a high degree of labor mobility because 
wages are also mostly affected by industry specific shocks whereas in Europe this result is 































































































Summary results for unemployment as a function of export performance
Dep.
Var.







*csc *cec •etc "ne *nd •tdc ■nd "tc








ni - - -
po - - - - - -
uk - -
Symbol indicates sign of signficant coefficient
Key to independent variable list.
"CSC Change in constant ECU exports
"ccc Change in intra-European expons as percentage GDP
"etc Change in total exports as percentage GDP
"nc Expon contribution to the growth in final uses
•nd Export contribution to the growth in final uses, difference with European avg.
•tdc Change in difference with European avg. of total exports as percentage GDP
•td Total exports as percentage GDP, difference with European avg.




























































































Table 2: Change in unemployment as a funtion of of its own history, the change in real 




Change in real 
exports (ECU 
19..)



































































N.b.: The table resumes results from regressions on annual data (1963-1993), oniv 
significant coefficients at 5% level above the critical t-value of 1.71 are reported. 
The empty boxes indicate that the corresponding coefficient is not significant. 
Standard errors in parentheses.

























































































































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
-  depending on the availability of stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) -  Italy 
Telefax No: +39/55/4685 636 
E-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it
From N am e.................................................................
Address..............................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1996/97
Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):




































































































W orking P apers o f  the
RSC No. 94/1
Fritz W. SCHARPF
Community and Autonomy Multilevel
Policy-Making in the European Union *
RSC No. 94/2
Paul McALEA VEY
The Political Logic of the European
Community Structural Funds Budget:




Japanese Public Policy for Cooperative 
Supply of Credit Guarantee to Small Firms - 
Its Evolution Since the Post War and Banks’ 
Commitment
RSC No. 94/4 
Thomas CHRISTIANSEN 
European Integration Between Political 
Science and International Relations Theory: 
The End of Sovereignty *
RSC No. 94/5
Stefaan DE RYNCK
The Europeanization of Regional
Development Policies in the Flemish Region
RSC No. 94/6
Enrique ALBEROLAILA 
Convergence Bands: A Proposal to Reform 




The EC and the New United Nations
RSC No. 94/8 
Sidney TARROW
Social Movements in Europe: Movement 
Society or Europeanization of Conflict?
RSC No. 94/9
Vojin DIMITRUEVIC
The 1974 Constitution as a Factor in the
Collapse of Yugoslavia or as a Sign of
Decaying Totalitarianism
R obert S ch um an  C en tre
RSC No. 94/10 
Susan STRANGE




Privatization in Disintegrating East European 
States: The Case of Former Yugoslavia
RSC No. 94/12 
Alberto CHILOSI
Property and Management Privatization in 
Eastern European Transition: Economic 
Consequences of Alternative Privatization 
Processes
RSC No. 94/13 
Richard SINNOTT
Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the 
Internationalisation of Issues: The 
Implications for Legitimacy *
RSC No. 94/14
Simon JOHNSON/Heidi KROLL 
Complementarities, Managers and Mass 
Privatization Programs after Communism
RSC No. 94/15 
Renzo DAVIDDI
Privatization in the Transition to a Market 
Economy
RSC No. 94/16 
Alberto BACCINI
Industrial Organization and the Financing of 
Small Firms: The Case of MagneTek
RSC No. 94/17
Jonathan GOLUB
The Pivotal Role of British Sovereignty in 
EC Environmental Policy
RSC No. 94/18
Peter Viggo JAKOBSEN 
Multilateralism Matters but How?
The Impact of Multilateralism on Great 































































































A ‘Federator’ for Europe: Altiero Spinelli 
and the Constituent Role of the European 
Parliament
RSC No. 94/20 
Johnny LAURSEN
Blueprints of Nordic Integration. Dynamics 




Mutual Trust, Credible Commitments and 
the Evolution of Rules for a Single 
European Market
RSC No. 95/2 
Ute COLLIER
Electricity Privatisation and Environmental 
Policy in the UK: Some Lessons for the 
Rest of Europe
RSC No. 95/3 
Giuliana GEMELLI 
American Influence on European 
Management Education: The Role of the 
Ford Foundation
RSC No. 95/4 
Renaud DEHOUSSE 
Institutional Reform in the European 




The New World Order, Incorporated:




Subnational Mobilisation in the European 
Union
RSC No. 95/7
Gary MARKS/Liesbet HOOGHE/Kermit 
BLANK
European Integration and the State
RSC No. 95/8
Sonia LUCARELLI
The International Community and the
Yugoslav Crisis: A Chronology of Events *
RSC No. 95/9
A Constitution for the European Union? 
Proceedings o f a Conference, 12-13 May 
1994, Organized by the Robert Schuman 
Centre with the Patronage o f the European 
Parliament
RSC No. 95/10 
Martin RHODES
‘Subversive Liberalism’: Market Integration, 
Globalisation and the European Welfare 
State
RSC No. 95/11
Joseph H.H. WEILER/ Ulrich HALTERN/ 
Franz MAYER
European Democracy and its Critique - 
Five Uneasy Pieces
RSC No. 95/12
Richard ROSE/Christian HAERPFER 
Democracy and Enlarging the European 
Union Eastward
RSC No. 95/13 
Donatella DELLA PORTA 
Social Movements and the State: Thoughts 
on the Policing of Protest
RSC No. 95/14
Patrick A. MC C ARTHY/Aris
ALEXOPOULOS
Theory Synthesis in IR - Problems & 
Possibilities
RSC No. 95/15 
Denise R. OSBORN 
Crime and the UK Economy
RSC No. 95/16 
Jérôme HENRY/Jens WEIDMANN 
The French-German Interest Rate 
Differential since German Unification:






































































































Joseph H.H. WEILER 
The State “über ailes”
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision
RSC No. 95/20 
Marc E. SMYRL
From Regional Policy Communities to 
European Networks: Inter-regional 
Divergence in the Implementation of EC 
Regional Policy in France
RSC No. 95/21
Claus-Dieter EHLERMANN 
Increased Differentiation or Stronger 
Uniformity
RSC No. 95/22 
Emile NOEL
La conférence intergouvemementale de 1996 
Vers un nouvel ordre institutionnel
RSC No. 95/23 
Jo SHAW
European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? 
Towards a New Dynamic
RSC No. 95/24 
Hervé BRIBOSIA
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Belgium
RSC No. 95/25 
Juliane KOKOTT
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Germany
RSC No. 95/26 ____
Monica CLAES/Bruno DE WITTE 
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on the Netherlands
RSC No. 95/27 
Karen ALTER
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context
Explaining National Court Acceptance o f 
European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation o f Theories o f Legal Integration
RSC No. 95/28 
Jens PLOTNER
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on France
RSC No. 95/29 
P.P. CRAIG
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on the United Kingdom
RSC No. 95/30
Francesco P. RUGGERILADERCHI 
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Italy
RSC No. 95/31 
Henri ETIENNE
The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in its Social Context 
Report on Luxembourg
RSC No. 95/32
Philippe A. WEBER-PANARIELLO 
The Integration of Matters of Justice and 
Home Affairs into Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union: A Step Towards more 
Demrxaacy?
RSC No. 95/33 
Debra MATTER
Data, Information, Evidence and Rhetoric in 
the Environmental Policy Process:
The Case of Solid Waste Management
RSC No. 95/34 
Michael J. ARTIS




Exchange Rate Arrangements for a Multi-
Speed Europe
RSC No. 95/36 
IverB. NEUMANN 
Collective Identity Formation: Self and 




























































































RSC No. 95/37 
Sonia LUCARELLI
The European Response to the Yugoslav 
Crisis: Story of a Two-Level Constraint
RSC No. 95/38 
Alec STONE SWEET 
Constitutional Dialogues in the European 
Community
RSC No. 95/39 
Thomas GEHRING 
Integrating Integration Theory: 
Neofunctionalism and International Regimes
RSC No. 95/40 
David COBHAM
The UK’s Search for a Monetary Policy:
In and Out of the ERM
RSC No. 96/1 
Ute COLLIER
Implementing a Climate Change Strategy in 
the European Union: Obstacles and 
Opportunities
RSC No. 96/2 
Jonathan GOLUB 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity in EU 
Environmental Policy
RSC No. 96/3 
Jonathan GOLUB
State Power and Institutional Influence in 




Intégration ou désintégration? Cinq thèses
sur l’incidence de l’intégration européenne
sur les structures étatiques
RSC No. 96/5 
Jens RASMUSSEN 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Risk Management Issues - Doing Things 
Safely with Words: Rules and Laws
RSC No. 96/6 
Olivier GODARD 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Social Decision-Making under Conditions o f 
Scientific Controversy, Expertise and the 
Precautionary Principle
RSC No. 96/7 
Robert HANKIN
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Cases o f Food and Pharmaceuticals
RSC No. 96/8 
Ernesto PREVIDI 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
L ’organisation des responsabilités publiques 
et privées dans la régulation européenne des 
risques: un vide institutionnel entre les 
deux?
RSC No. 96/9 
Josef FALKE
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Role o f Non-governmental 
Standardization Organizations in the 




Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and 
the European Court o f Justice: Legal 
Frameworks fo r  Denationalized Governance 
Structures
RSC No. 96/11 
Martin SHAPIRO 
Integrating Scientific Expertise into 
Regulatory Decision-Making.
The Frontiers o f Science Doctrine: American 
Experiences with the Judicial Control o f 
Science-Based Decision-Making
RSC No. 96/12 
Gianna BOERQ/Giuseppe TULLIO 
Currency Substitution and the Stability of 
the German Demand for Money Function 





























































































Riccardo MARSELLI/Marco VANNINI 
Estimating the Economic Model of Crime in 
the Presence of Organised Crime: Evidence 
from Italy
RSC No. 96/14 
Paul DE GRAUWE
The Economics of Convergence Towards 
Monetary Union in Europe
RSC No. 96/15 
Daniel GROS
A Reconsideration of the Cost of EMU 
The Importance of External Shocks and 
Labour Mobility
RSC No. 96/16
Pierre LASCOUMES/Jérôme VALLUY 
Les activités publiques conventionnelles 
(APC): un nouvel instrument de politique 



















































































































































































































































































- - c o i
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
